With regard to the supply of products, the current issue of the following document is applicable:

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1 Introduction

1.1 Content of this Document

This document contains information for usage of the device in functional safety-related applications. You need this information to use your product throughout the applicable stages of the product life cycle. These can include the following:

- Product identification
- Delivery, transport, and storage
- Mounting and installation
- Commissioning and operation
- Maintenance and repair
- Troubleshooting
- Dismounting
- Disposal

Note

This document does not substitute the instruction manual.

Note

For full information on the product, refer to the instruction manual and further documentation on the Internet at www.pepperl-fuchs.com.

The documentation consists of the following parts:

- Present document
- Instruction manual
- Manual
- Datasheet

Additionally, the following parts may belong to the documentation, if applicable:

- EU-type examination certificate
- EU declaration of conformity
- Attestation of conformity
- Certificates
- Control drawings
- FMEDA report
- Assessment report
- Additional documents

For more information about Pepperl+Fuchs products with functional safety, see www.pepperl-fuchs.com/sil.
1.2 Safety Information

Target Group, Personnel
Responsibility for planning, assembly, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and dismounting lies with the plant operator.
Only appropriately trained and qualified personnel may carry out mounting, installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and dismounting of the product. The personnel must have read and understood the instruction manual and the further documentation.

Intended Use
The device is only approved for appropriate and intended use. Ignoring these instructions will void any warranty and absolve the manufacturer from any liability.
The device is developed, manufactured and tested according to the relevant safety standards.
Use the device only
- for the application described
- with specified environmental conditions
- with devices that are suitable for this safety application

Improper Use
Protection of the personnel and the plant is not ensured if the device is not used according to its intended use.
### 1.3 Symbols Used

This document contains symbols for the identification of warning messages and informative messages.

#### Warning Messages

You will find warning messages, whenever dangers may arise from your actions. It is mandatory that you observe these warning messages for your personal safety and in order to avoid property damage.

Depending on the risk level, the warning messages are displayed in descending order as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Danger!" /></td>
<td>This symbol indicates an imminent danger. Non-observance will result in personal injury or death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Warning!" /></td>
<td>This symbol indicates a possible fault or danger. Non-observance may cause personal injury or serious property damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Caution!" /></td>
<td>This symbol indicates a possible fault. Non-observance could interrupt the device and any connected systems and plants, or result in their complete failure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Informative Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Note" /></td>
<td>This symbol brings important information to your attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Action" /></td>
<td>This symbol indicates a paragraph with instructions. You are prompted to perform an action or a sequence of actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Product Description

2.1 Function

General
The device monitors an overspeed condition or an underspeed condition of the binary signal of a NAMUR sensor or mechanical contact.
The input frequency is compared to the user-defined reference frequency.
The input frequency is 1 mHz to 5 kHz.
The overspeed condition or the underspeed condition is signaled via the relay contact outputs.
A fault is signalized by LEDs.
The start-up override feature sets the relay contact outputs to default conditions defined by the user for up to 1000 seconds.
The device is easily configured by the use of keypad.
The device is mounted on a 35 mm DIN mounting rail according to EN 60715.

KFA5-DWB-Ex1.D
This isolated barrier is used for intrinsic safety applications.
The input is designed for use with 2-wire sensors.
The device is supplied by a power supply of 115 V AC.

KFA6-DWB-Ex1.D
This isolated barrier is used for intrinsic safety applications.
The input is designed for use with 2-wire sensors.
The device is supplied by a power supply of 230 V AC.

KFD2-DWB-1.D
This signal conditioner provides the galvanic isolation between field circuits and control circuits.
The input is designed for use with 2- or 3-wire sensors.
The device is supplied by a power supply of 24 V DC.
If the device is operated via Power Rail, additionally a collective error message is available.

KFD2-DWB-Ex1.D
This isolated barrier is used for intrinsic safety applications.
The input is designed for use with 2-wire sensors.
The device is supplied by a power supply of 24 V DC.
If the device is operated via Power Rail, additionally a collective error message is available.

KFU8-DWB-1.D
This signal conditioner provides the galvanic isolation between field circuits and control circuits.
The input is designed for use with 2- or 3-wire sensors.
The device can be supplied by a power supply from 20 V DC to 90 V DC or from 48 V AC to 253 V AC.
2.2 Interfaces

The device has the following interfaces:

- Safety relevant interfaces: input, output I, output II
- Non-safety relevant interfaces:
  - Start-up override input
  - Fault indication output
  - KFD2-DWB-(Ex)1.D: collective error message output

Note
For corresponding connections see datasheet.

2.3 Marking

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KFA5-DWB-Ex1.D, KFA6-DWB-Ex1.D, KFD2-DWB-1.D,
KFD2-DWB-Ex1.D, KFU8-DWB-1.D

Up to SIL 2

2.4 Standards and Directives for Functional Safety

Device-specific standards and directives

|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

System-specific standards and directives

|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
3 Planning

3.1 System Structure

3.1.1 Low Demand Mode of Operation

If there are two control loops, one for the standard operation and another one for the functional safety, then usually the demand rate for the safety loop is assumed to be less than once per year.

The relevant safety parameters to be verified are:

- the PFD\textsubscript{avg} value (average Probability of dangerous Failure on Demand) and the T\textsubscript{1} value (proof test interval that has a direct impact on the PFD\textsubscript{avg} value)
- the SFF value (Safe Failure Fraction)
- the HFT architecture (Hardware Fault Tolerance)

3.1.2 High Demand or Continuous Mode of Operation

If there is only one safety loop, which combines the standard operation and safety-related operation, then usually the demand rate for this safety loop is assumed to be higher than once per year.

The relevant safety parameters to be verified are:

- the PFH value (Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour)
- Fault reaction time of the safety system
- the SFF value (Safe Failure Fraction)
- the HFT architecture (Hardware Fault Tolerance)

3.1.3 Safe Failure Fraction

The safe failure fraction describes the ratio of all safe failures and dangerous detected failures to the total failure rate.

\[
\text{SFF} = \frac{\lambda_s + \lambda_{dd}}{\lambda_s + \lambda_{dd} + \lambda_{du}}
\]

A safe failure fraction as defined in IEC/EN 61508 is only relevant for elements or (sub)systems in a complete safety loop. The device under consideration is always part of a safety loop but is not regarded as a complete element or subsystem.

For calculating the SIL of a safety loop it is necessary to evaluate the safe failure fraction of elements, subsystems and the complete system, but not of a single device.

Nevertheless the SFF of the device is given in this document for reference.
3.2 Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made during the FMEDA:

- Failure rate based on the Siemens standard SN 29500.
- Failure rates are constant, wear is not considered.
- External power supply failure rates are not included.
- The device will be used under average industrial ambient conditions comparable to the classification **stationary mounted** according to MIL-HDBK-217F.
  Alternatively, operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field environment similar to IEC/EN 60654-1 Class C with an average temperature over a long period of time of 40 °C may be assumed. For a higher average temperature of 60 °C, the failure rates must be multiplied by a factor of 2.5 based on experience. A similar factor must be used if frequent temperature fluctuations are expected.
- The fault indication output which signals if the field circuits are broken or shorted is not considered in the FMEDA and the calculations.
- The indication of a dangerous failure (via fault bus) is detected within 1 hour by the programmable logic controller (PLC).
- The application program in the programmable logic controller (PLC) is configured to detect underrange and overrange failures. These failures have been classified as **dangerous detected** failures.
- If you are using the device in high demand mode, observe also the useful lifetime limitations of the output relays according to the datasheet.
- The display function and the displayed values are not part of the safety function.
- The IEC/EN 61511-1 section 11.4.4 allows devices to be used in applications one SIL higher than given by table 3 of IEC/EN 61508-2, if the device is proven-in-use. The assessment and proven-in-use demonstration lead to the result that the device may be used in applications up to SIL 2. However, it is the responsibility of the end-user to decide on applying proven-in-use devices.

**SIL 2 application**

- To build a SIL safety loop for the defined SIL, it is assumed as an example that this device uses 15 % of the available budget for PFD\(_{avg}/PFH\).
- For a SIL 2 application operating in low demand mode the total PFD\(_{avg}\) value of the SIF (Safety Instrumented Function) should be smaller than 10\(^{-5}\), hence the maximum allowable PFD\(_{avg}\) value would then be 1.5 x 10\(^{-5}\).
- For a SIL 2 application operating in high demand mode the total PFH value of the SIF should be smaller than 10\(^{-6}\) per hour, hence the maximum allowable PFH value would then be 1.5 x 10\(^{-7}\) per hour.
- The safety-related device is considered to be of type **B** device with a hardware fault tolerance of **0**.
3.3 Safety Function and Safe State

Safe State
The safe state of output I and output II is the de-energized state (high impedance).

Safety Function
The safe state is achieved, when the measured frequency leaves the permissible range for the application.

Device Settings via Keypad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Menu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Password protection</td>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short circuit detection</td>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead breakage detection</td>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>Error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1

Note
For more information see the manual.

Line Fault Detection
For use in a safety function enable the line fault detection.
The input loop of all versions is supervised. The related safety function is that the outputs go to fault state (safe state) if a line fault is detected.

Note
The collective error message output is not safety-relevant.
3.4 Characteristic Safety Values

KFU8-DWB-1.D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Characteristic values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment type and documentation</td>
<td>FMEDA and proven in use assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Device type</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of operation</td>
<td>Low demand mode or high demand mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low demand mode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL (SC)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety function</td>
<td>De-energized to safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault reaction time 1</td>
<td>1 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault reaction time 2</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_s$</td>
<td>237 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{dd}$</td>
<td>29.6 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{du}$</td>
<td>132 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{total (safety function)}$</td>
<td>398 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{not, part}$</td>
<td>31.6 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFF 3</td>
<td>66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTBF 4</td>
<td>178 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFH</td>
<td>$1.32 \times 10^{-7} , 1/h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD avg for T1 = 1 year</td>
<td>$5.78 \times 10^{-4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD avg for T1 = 2 years</td>
<td>$1.16 \times 10^{-3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD avg for T1 = 5 years</td>
<td>$2.89 \times 10^{-3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction time 5</td>
<td>$1 , s + 1/!f$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The values for a fault reaction time of 5 min benefit from internal software diagnostic functions and are therefore deemed suitable only for low demand application.

2 The fault reaction time is the delay time after discovering an internal fault by diagnostics in the device. The sampling rate is not relevant.

3 **No effect failures** are not influencing the safety function and are therefore not included in the SFF and the failure rates.

4 acc. to SN29500. This value includes failures which are not part of the safety function/MTTR = 8 h. The value is calculated for one safety function of the device.

5 For the reaction time, the delay time of the electronic circuit and the delay resulting from sampling the signals (1/\!f) are added.
### KFD2-DWB-1.D, KFD2-DWB-Ex1.D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Characteristic values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment type and documentation</td>
<td>FMEDA and proven in use assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Device type</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of operation 1</td>
<td>Low demand mode or high demand mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL (SC)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety function</td>
<td>De-energized to safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault reaction time 2</td>
<td>1 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_s^3$</td>
<td>189 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{dd}$</td>
<td>20.9 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{du}$</td>
<td>138 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{total (safety function)}^3$</td>
<td>347 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{not part}$</td>
<td>33.0 FIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFF 4</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTBF 4</td>
<td>202 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFH</td>
<td>$1.38 \times 10^{-7}$ 1/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD$_{avg}$ for $T_1 = 1$ year</td>
<td>$6.04 \times 10^{-4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD$_{avg}$ for $T_1 = 2$ years</td>
<td>$1.21 \times 10^{-3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD$_{avg}$ for $T_1 = 5$ years</td>
<td>$3.02 \times 10^{-3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction time 5</td>
<td>1 s + 1/f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3**

1. The values for a fault reaction time of 5 min benefit from internal software diagnostic functions and are therefore deemed suitable only for low demand application.
2. The fault reaction time is the delay time after discovering an internal fault by diagnostics in the device. The sampling rate is not relevant.
3. No effect failures are not influencing the safety function and are therefore not included in the SFF and the failure rates.
4. acc. to SN29500. This value includes failures which are not part of the safety function/MTTR = 8 h. The value is calculated for one safety function of the device.
5. For the reaction time, the delay time of the electronic circuit and the delay resulting from sampling the signals (1/f) are added.
The characteristic safety values like PFD, PFH, SFF, HFT and T<sub>1</sub> are taken from the FMEDA report. Observe that PFD and T<sub>1</sub> are related to each other.

The function of the devices has to be checked within the proof test interval (T<sub>1</sub>).
3.5 **Useful Lifetime**

Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation this only applies provided that the useful lifetime of components is not exceeded. Beyond this useful lifetime, the result of the probabilistic estimation is meaningless as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on the component itself and its operating conditions – temperature in particular. For example, electrolytic capacitors can be very sensitive to the operating temperature.

This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve, which shows the typical behavior for electronic components.

Therefore it is obvious that failure calculation is only valid for components that have this constant domain and that the validity of the calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.

It is assumed that early failures are detected to a huge percentage during the installation and therefore the assumption of a constant failure rate during the useful lifetime is valid.

However, according to IEC/EN 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on general experience, should be assumed. Experience has shown that the useful lifetime often lies within a range period of about 8 to 12 years.

As noted in DIN EN 61508-2:2011 note N3, appropriate measures taken by the manufacturer and plant operator can extend the useful lifetime.

Our experience has shown that the useful lifetime of a Pepperl+Fuchs product can be higher if the ambient conditions support a long life time, for example if the ambient temperature is significantly below 60 °C.

Please note that the useful lifetime refers to the (constant) failure rate of the device. The effective life time can be higher.

The estimated useful lifetime is greater than the warranty period prescribed by law or the manufacturer's guarantee period. However, this does not result in an extension of the warranty or guarantee services. Failure to reach the estimated useful lifetime is no a material defect.

**Derating**

For the safety application, reduce the number of switching cycles or the maximum current. A derating to 2/3 of the maximum value is adequate.

**Maximum Switching Power of Output Contacts**

The useful lifetime is limited by the maximum switching cycles of the relays under load conditions.

For requirements regarding the connected output load, refer to the documentation of the connected peripheral devices.

**Note**

See corresponding datasheets for further information.
4 Mounting and Installation

Mounting and Installing the Device

1. Observe the safety instructions in the instruction manual.
2. Observe the information in the manual.
3. Observe the requirements for the safety loop.
4. Connect the device only to devices that are suitable for this safety application.
5. Check the safety function to ensure the expected output behavior.

4.1 Configuration

Configuring the Device

The device is configured via keypad. The keypad for setting the safety functions is on the front of the device.

1. Open the cover.
2. Configure the device for the required safety function via the keypad, see chapter 3.3.
3. Secure the device configuration by a password against changing.
4. Leave the parameterization mode to prevent unintentional adjustments.
5. Close the cover.
6. Check the device configuration to ensure the expected output behavior.
7. Document any changes to the device configuration.

Note

For more information see the manual.
5 Operation

Danger!
Danger to life from missing safety function
If the safety loop is put out of service, the safety function is no longer guaranteed.

• Do not deactivate the device.
• Do not bypass the safety function.
• Do not repair, modify, or manipulate the device.

Danger!
Danger to life from missing safety function
With enabled start-up override, dangerous faults can remain undetected. The safety function is no longer guaranteed.

Observe that the safety function is not carried out correctly while the start-up override is active. Ensure that the input of the start-up override is not accidentally bridged.

Danger!
Danger to life from missing safety function
The outputs of the device use common components. If you use these outputs in safety functions, the outputs can fail all at the same time. You cannot establish redundancy this way.

When planning a safety function, observe that these outputs can fail simultaneously due to a failure in the same component.

Danger!
Danger to life from missing safety function
If the outputs of the device are not tested regularly, the safety function is no longer guaranteed. If you use the device in low demand mode applications, test the outputs once a year.

Operating the device

1. Observe the safety instructions in the instruction manual.
2. Observe the information in the manual.
3. Use the device only with devices that are suitable for this safety application.
4. Correct any occurring safe failures within 8 hours.
   Take measures to maintain the safety function while the device is being repaired.
5.1 Proof Test

This section describes a possible proof test procedure. The user is not obliged to use this proposal. The user may consider different concepts with an individual determination of the respective effectiveness, e.g. concepts according to NA106:2018.

According to IEC/EN 61508-2 a recurring proof test shall be undertaken to reveal potential dangerous failures that are not detected otherwise.

Check the function of the subsystem at periodic intervals depending on the applied PFD_{avg} in accordance with the characteristic safety values. See chapter 3.4.

It is under the responsibility of the plant operator to define the type of proof test and the interval time period.

Equipment required:

- Digital multimeter with an accuracy of 0.1 %
  Use for the proof test of the intrinsic safety side of the device a special digital multimeter for intrinsically safe circuits.
  If intrinsically safe circuits are operated with non-intrinsically safe circuits, they must no longer be used as intrinsically safe circuits.
- Frequency generator configured to deliver NAMUR signals with an accuracy of 1 %
- Power supply set to nominal voltage
- Load resistor i.e. 240 $\Omega$, 2.5 W
- Simulate the sensor state by a potentiometer of 4.7 k$\Omega$ (threshold for normal operation), by a resistor of 200 $\Omega$ (short circuit detection) and by a resistor of 220 k$\Omega$ (lead breakage detection).
Proof Test Procedure for the Switching Threshold

1. Test in the proof test with the same configuration which is used in the application. Substitute the sensors by sensor simulators or calibrators.
2. If the start-up override is enabled, disable the start-up override. That means, do not bridge the input of the start-up override.
3. Test the input channel. The switching threshold depends on the device type:
   - KF**-DWB-1.D devices: 1.4 mA to 1.9 mA
   - KF**-DWB-Ex1.D devices: 1.9 mA to 2.5 mA
   For normal mode of operation the corresponding yellow LED must have lit, if the input current is above the threshold.
4. Connect a resistor RSC (200 Ω) or a resistor RLB (220 kΩ) to the input.
   The device must detect an external fault. This state is indicated by red LED and the relay of the corresponding output must be de-activated.
5. Attach a load and supply defined by the application's current and voltage.
6. After the test, reset the device to the original settings.
7. Leave the parameterization mode to prevent unintentional adjustments.
8. Check the settings after the configuration by suitable tests.

Proof Test Procedure for the Relay Contact Output

1. Test in the proof test with the same configuration which is used in the application. Substitute the sensors by sensor simulators or calibrators.
2. Connect the frequency generator to terminals 1+ and 3-.
3. Set the frequency on the frequency generator 1 % below and 1 % above the defined threshold for the considered output. Check the hysteresis behavior and adjust the trip point accordingly.
4. Connect a digital multimeter to the output. Attach a load and supply defined by the application's current and voltage.
5. Measure the output behavior. Compare the output behavior with the intended behavior.
   If you use the pulse divider functionality, the output frequency must have a value corresponding to the configured divider ratio.
6. After the test, reset the device to the original settings.
7. Check the settings after the configuration by suitable tests.
Figure 5.1 Proof test set-up for KF**-DWB-(Ex)1.D

Usage in Zone 0, 1, 2/Div. 1, 2 only for KFA5-DWB-Ex1.D, KFA6-DWB-Ex1.D, and KFD2-DWB-Ex1.D
6 Maintenance and Repair

Danger!
Danger to life from missing safety function
Changes to the device or a defect of the device can lead to device malfunction. The function of the device and the safety function is no longer guaranteed. Do not repair, modify, or manipulate the device.

Maintaining, Repairing or Replacing the Device
In case of maintenance, repair or replacement of the device, proceed as follows:

1. Implement appropriate maintenance procedures for regular maintenance of the safety loop.
2. While the device is maintained, repaired or replaced, the safety function does not work. Take appropriate measures to protect personnel and equipment while the safety function is not available. Secure the application against accidental restart.
3. Do not repair a defective device. A defective device must only be repaired by the manufacturer.
4. If there is a defect, always replace the device with an original device.

Reporting Device Failure
If you use the device in a safety loop according to IEC/EN 61508, it is required to inform the device manufacturer about possible systematic failures. Report all failures in the safety function that are due to functional limitations or a loss of device function – especially in the case of possible dangerous failures.

In these cases, contact your local sales partner or the Pepperl+Fuchs technical sales support (service line).

It is not necessary to report failures in the safety function that are due to external influences or damage.
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous faults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIT</td>
<td>Failure In Time in $10^{-9}$ 1/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMEDA</td>
<td>Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_s$</td>
<td>Probability of safe failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{dd}$</td>
<td>Probability of dangerous detected failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{du}$</td>
<td>Probability of dangerous undetected failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{\text{no effect}}$</td>
<td>Probability of failures of components in the safety loop that have no effect on the safety function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{\text{not part}}$</td>
<td>Probability of failure of components that are not in the safety loop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{\text{total (safety function)}}$</td>
<td>Probability of failure of components that are in the safety loop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFT</td>
<td>Hardware Fault Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTBF</td>
<td>Mean Time Between Failures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTTF&lt;sub&gt;D&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Mean Time To dangerous Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTTR</td>
<td>Mean Time To Restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Process Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD&lt;sub&gt;avg&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Average Probability of dangerous Failure on Demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFH</td>
<td>Average frequency of dangerous failure per hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Performance Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Programmable Logic Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Proof Test Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Systematic Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFF</td>
<td>Safe Failure Fraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIF</td>
<td>Safety Instrumented Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL</td>
<td>Safety Integrity Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Safety Instrumented System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_1$</td>
<td>Proof Test Interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLT</td>
<td>Fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB</td>
<td>Lead Breakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFD</td>
<td>Line Fault Detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Short Circuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_{\text{service}}$</td>
<td>Time from start of operation to putting the device out of service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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